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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page44 of 93 31 Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, tit. II, § 211(1), 120 Stat. 587, 616 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3299 (2006)). 3. Retroactivity under Landgraf In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), the Supreme Court set forth a two-part frame- work for determining whether a statute may be ap- plied retroactively. At the first step, “if Congress ex- pressly prescribed that a statute applies retroactively to antecedent conduct, the inquiry ends and the court enforces the statute as it is written, save for constitu- tional concerns.” Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 54-55. If, however, the “statute is ambiguous or contains no ex- press command regarding retroactivity,” then the court must turn to the second step, where “a reviewing court must determine whether applying the statute to antecedent conduct would create presumptively im- permissible retroactive effects.” Jd. at 55. “If it would, then the court shall not apply the statute retroactively absent clear congressional intent to the contrary.” Id. “If it would not, then the court shall apply the statute to antecedent conduct.” Id. B. Discussion 1. There Was No Impermissible Retroactivity in Applying Section 3283 to Maxwell Maxwell claims that the District Court erred by ap- plying Section 3283’s 2003 amendment to her three counts of conviction, 1.e., Counts Three, Four, and Six, because they involved conduct that pre-dated the amendment. As an initial matter, this argument ig- nores the fact that Counts Three and Six both charge DOJ-OGR-00021691