DOJ-OGR-00021694.jpg

Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page47 of 93 34 Court has considered both statutory text and legisla- tive history. In re Enter. Mort. Acceptance Co. Sec. Litig. (‘Enterprise’), 391 F.3d 401, 406-08 (2d Cir. 2004). Here, the text and history of Section 3283 estab- lish that Congress intended to extend the time to bring charges of child sexual abuse in cases where the limi- tations period had not yet expired. Prior to 2003, any child sex abuse offense could be prosecuted until the victim reached the age of 25 years, at which point the statute of limitations then in effect would bar prosecution. In the 2003 amendment, which was titled, “No Statute of Limitations for Child Abduc- tion and Sex Crimes,” Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 202, 117 Stat. 660, Congress explicitly provided that “[n]o stat- ute of limitations that would otherwise preclude pros- ecution for [such an offense] shall preclude such pros- ecution during the life of the child.” 18 U.S.C. § 32838 (2003). The amendment draws no distinction between pre-enactment and post-enactment conduct. Instead, as Judge Nathan explained, by stating that “no statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecu- tion of these offenses will apply,” the amendment’s “plain language unambiguously requires that it apply to prosecutions for offenses committed before the date of enactment.” (A.151). Thus, the breadth of the text shows that Congress intended “to extend the ... stat- ute of limitations,” even for pre-enactment conduct. United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684 (8th Cir. 2005) (reaching same conclusion as to § 3283’s prede- cessor based on similar “title and ... wording” of stat- ute); cf. Enterprise, 391 F.3d at 407 (describing provi- sion that “no limitation shall terminate the period within which suit may be filed” as example of statute DOJ-OGR-00021694