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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page52 of 93 39 the charges against Maxwell did not expire before the statute of limitations was extended. Thus, unlike En- terprise, where resurrection of expired claims would have “stripp[ed] [defendants] of a complete affirmative defense they previously possessed,” id. at 410, here Maxwell never possessed that complete defense. Judge Nathan correctly concluded that the 2003 amendment accordingly “did not deprive [Maxwell] of any vested rights.” (A.153). To be sure, this Court has observed that there may be “colorable arguments” that “the logic of Enterprise extends to criminal cases where the defendant’s stat- ute of limitations defense had not vested when the lim- itations period was extended” because the extension “increases the period of time during which a defend- ant can be sued,’ thereby ‘increasing a defendant’s lia- bility for past conduct.” Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 57 (quoting Enterprise, 391 F.3d at 410); see also United States v. Miller, 911 F.3d 638, 644-46 (1st Cir. 2018) (discussing potential defense arguments). But such a claim runs headlong into “the vast weight of retroac- tivity decisions,” which recognize that “revoking a vested statute of limitations defense is different from retroactively extending the filing period for a still-via- ble claim.” Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 57 (collecting cases). For example, “in the criminal context, there is a consensus that extending a limitations period before prosecution is time-barred does not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.” Cruz v. Maypa, 773 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Stogner, 539 U.S. at 632 (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause DOJ-OGR-00021699