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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page51 of 93 38 certain discrimination claims, and held that applying the new statute in a case “filed after its enactment, but arising out of events that predate its enactment,” is not impermissibly retroactive under Landgraf. Id. at 889- 90. As the Court explained, “[t]he conduct to which the statute of limitations applies is not the primary con- duct of the defendants, the alleged discrimination, but is instead the secondary conduct of the plaintiffs, the filing of their suit.” Id. at 890. The 2003 amendment to Section 3283 likewise applies only to the secondary conduct of filing a criminal case; it does not apply to the primary conduct of Maxwell’s child sexual abuse by, for example, modifying the elements of an offense to criminalize conduct that previously had not consti- tuted a crime. See id. at 891 (“Landgraf and other cases countenance treating statutes of limitations dif- ferently from statutory provisions that affect substan- tive rights.”). Thus, like the new statute in Vernon, the 2003 amendment “impaired no rights possessed by ei- ther party, increased neither party’s liability, nor im- posed any new duties with respect to past transac- tions.” Id. at 890. Enterprise does not alter this conclusion. There, this Court considered whether an amended statute of limitations operated to “revive already expired securi- ties fraud claims.” Enterprise, 391 F.3d at 405. While acknowledging that under Vernon, “retroactive appli- cation of a revised statute of limitations generally does not have an impermissible retroactive effect,” the Court concluded that “the resurrection of previously time-barred claims has an impermissible retroactive effect.” Id. at 409-10 (emphasis removed). Enterprise has no application here, as the limitations period for DOJ-OGR-00021698