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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page56 of 93 43 in fact sexually abused when transported across state lines, including to New York, as a minor. Instead, Max- well insists that Counts Three and Four do not involve sexual abuse of a child because a completed sex act is not an element of those crimes. This argument mis- reads the relevant statutes and legislative history, and runs contrary to the decisions of this Court and other Courts of Appeals.!! a. Counts Three and Four Are Offenses Involving the Sexual Abuse of a Child Maxwell’s entire argument is based on a mistaken premise: that the phrase “offense involving the sexual ... abuse... of a child,” 18 U.S.C. § 3283, only encom- passes crimes in which “unlawful sexual activity actu- ally took place.” (Br.44). This flawed proposition ig- nores relevant statutory definitions, which make clear that Section 3283 reaches more broadly to include of- fenses in which there was no completed illegal sex act. As described above, Section 3283 was originally codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k). The definition of the term “sexual abuse” is located within that same sec- tion: For purposes of this section ... the term ‘sexual abuse’ includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, 11 Maxwell raises no analogous argument with re- spect to Count Six, which charges sex trafficking of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591. DOJ-OGR-00021703