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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page58 of 93 45 illustrative, not exhaustive.” Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 162 (2012) (citing Burgess v. United States, 552 U.S. 124, 131 n.3 (2008)). And the text of Section 3283 goes even further beyond the definition provided in Section 3509 by cov- ering any crime “involving” the sexual abuse of a child. Congress therefore did not require that a particular statute have actual sexual contact with a minor as an element of its offense, but rather swept broadly to cover any crime that in any way involves sexual abuse as broadly defined. Given this expansive language, sexual abuse “as defined here encompasses a wider set of behavior than just rape or other unwanted sexual touching.” United States v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186, 197 (8d Cir. 2015). Thus, courts throughout the coun- try have concluded that Section 3283 applies to a vari- ety of offenses that do not require “a sexual act be- tween a defendant and a specific child,” United States v. Vickers, No. 13 Cr. 128 (RJA), 2014 WL 1838255, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. May 8, 2014), or “physical contact with the victim,” Carpenter, 680 F.3d at 1103; accord United States v. Diehl, 775 F.3d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 2015). Section 3283’s definition thus captures crimes of in- tent where a perpetrator seeks to have a minor engage in sexual contact even if such sexual contact does not occur. Transportation of a minor with intent to engage in an illegal sex act (as charged in Count Four) and conspiracy to commit the same (as charged in Count Three) fall comfortably within that definition. Even though a completed sex act is not required to commit those two crimes, Count Four has “sexual abuse” as an element because it requires the defendant to DOJ-OGR-00021705