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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page60 of 93 47 Maxwell first relies on Section 3283’s use of the phrase “offense involving” the sexual abuse of a child, which, she contends, “dictates” looking only to the ele- ments of the offense. (Br.43). But as this Court has al- ready recognized, Section 3283’s text “reaches beyond the offense and its legal elements to the conduct ‘in- volv[ed]’ in the offense”—a “linguistic expansion” that shows Congress’s intent for “courts to look beyond the bare legal charges in deciding whether § 3283 ap- plied.” Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 59-60; see also Nijha- wan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 32, 38 (2009) (holding that a statute that includes an “offense ... involves” phrase is “consistent with a circumstance-specific approach”). Indeed, the Third Circuit has expressly rejected an ““assential ingredient’ test” comparable to the categor- ical approach and instead applied case-specific analy- sis to determine that Section 3283 applied to travel with intent to commit an illegal sex act with a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). Schneider, 801 F.3d at 196-97. Maxwell also argues that “the clear weight of au- thority” holds that statutes employing similar lan- guage “should be read through a categorical rather than case-specific lens.” (Br.44-45). But the decisions she cites involved statutes with other features favoring the categorical approach, which are notably absent here. Some cases involved statutes that defined a “crime of violence” as an offense that either “has as an element” the use of physical force or “by its nature” in- volves a substantial risk of force—language that in- vokes an elements-based approach. United States v. Davis, 1389 S. Ct. 2319, 2328-29 (2019); Leocal v. Ash- croft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004). Some cases concerned the DOJ-OGR-00021707