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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page61 of 93 48 definition of an “aggravated felony” under federal im- migration law, Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478 (2012); Leocal, 543 U.S. at 7, a context in which the categorical approach traditionally applies because the inquiry is whether the alien’s prior conviction meets the definition. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 59. And United States v. Morgan, 393 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2004), is like- wise distinguishable, as it “involved a venue statute presenting significantly different concerns” than those present here. (A.148). Maxwell also relies on a trio of cases, chief among them Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1958). (Br.45-47). In Bridges, the Supreme Court “applied an ‘essential ingredient’ test to determine whether an of- fense qualified for a provision ... that extended the criminal limitations period for certain fraud offenses.” Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 59 n.10. But as this Court has explained, “Bridges is distinguishable” because the Su- preme Court “there believed applying the restrictive ‘essential ingredient’ test to determine if an offense ‘in- volv[ed] the defrauding of the United States’ effectu- ated Congress’s specific intent to limit the... extended limitations period to only a few offenses,” while “Con- gress had the opposite intention for § 3283.” Id. The other two cases, United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518 (1932), and United States v. Noveck, 271 U.S. 201 (1926), are distinguishable on similar grounds. In any event, the “essential ingredient” test does not help Maxwell. As discussed above, an “offense involving the sexual... abuse... of a child,” 18 U.S.C. § 3283, must be read in light of the definition of “sexual abuse” set forth in Section 3509(a), which encompasses a wide range of conduct that is not limited to actual sexual DOJ-OGR-00021708