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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page62 of 93 49 contact with a child. Counts Three and Four each have an “essential ingredient” that fits within that broad definition. See supra Point II.B.2.a. Finally, neither Dieh! nor United States v. Coun- tentos, 651 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2011), supports the use of a categorical approach. (Br.51-52). In each decision, the court concluded that Section 3283 applied to the subject offenses without considering the specific facts of the crime, but in neither case did the court consider whether a categorical approach was required—let alone hold that it was. As noted above, it is undisputed that the evidence at trial established that Maxwell’s commission of Counts Three and Four involved completed sex acts abusing one or more minor victims: Jane testified that she was in fact sexually abused when transported across state lines, including to New York, as a minor. Accordingly, Counts Three and Four qualify as of- fenses involving the sexual abuse of a child both by their statutory terms and based on the specific facts of this case. POINT Ill The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Concluding that Juror 50 Could Be Fair and Impartial Notwithstanding His Inadvertent Mistakes on His Juror Questionnaire Maxwell contends that she was denied her right to a fair and impartial jury because a juror failed to dis- close during voir dire that he was sexually abused as a child, and therefore incorrectly answered three DOJ-OGR-00021709