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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page69 of 93 56 B. Applicable Law Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) permits a district court to “vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” As this Court has explained, “[t]he defendant bears the bur- den of proving that he is entitled to a new trial under Rule 33, and before ordering a new trial pursuant to Rule 33, a district court must find that there is a real concern that an innocent person may have been con- victed.” United States v. McCourty, 562 F.3d 458, 475 (2d Cir. 2009). Post-verdict inquiries into juror conduct are strongly disfavored. Such inquiries “seriously disrupt the finality of the process.” Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120-21 (1987). Permitting “post-verdict scrutiny of juror conduct” would undermine pillars that undergird the jury trial right, including “full and frank discussion in the jury room, jurors’ willingness to return an unpopular verdict, and the community’s trust in a system that relies on the decisions of laypeo- ple.” Jd. Such inquiries may instead “lead to evil con- sequences: subjecting juries to harassment, inhibiting juryroom deliberation, burdening courts with merit- less applications, increasing temptation for jury tam- pering and creating uncertainty in jury verdicts.” United States v. Janniello, 866 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1989). Accordingly, a defendant seeking Rule 33 relief based on alleged juror misrepresentations during voir dire must satisfy a stringent two-part test. First, a party must “demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire.” McDonough DOJ-OGR-00021716