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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page/0 of 93 57 Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984). Second, the party must show “that a correct re- sponse would have provided a valid basis for a chal- lenge for cause.” Id. To satisfy this prong, a court must determine whether, if the juror had answered truth- fully, it would have granted a hypothetical strike for cause. United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 304 (2d Cir. 2006). A party may challenge a juror for cause based only on “narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable bases.” United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997). In the context of voir dire, challenges for cause generally fall into one of three “limited” categories: ac- tual bias, implied bias, or inferable bias. Jd. “Actual bias is bias in fact—the existence of a state of mind that leads to an inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality.” Jd. Implied bias, also called “presumed bias,” is “bias conclusively presumed as a matter of law.” Id. at 45. This Court has emphasized that this category is “narrow,” and “reserved for ‘ex- ceptional situations,” generally meaning circum- stances in which jurors “are related to the parties” or “were victims of the alleged crime itself.” Id. at 45-46. Finally, “[b]ias may be inferred when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a risk of partiality sufficiently sig- nificant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of bias.” Id. at 46-47. Where there are concrete allegations of juror mis- conduct, a court may conduct a post-verdict hearing. See United States v. Baker, 899 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 2018). The inquiry “should be limited to only what is DOJ-OGR-00021717