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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page/1 of 93 58 absolutely necessary to determine the facts with preci- sion.” Janniello, 866 F.2d at 544. “[T]he proper func- tioning of the jury system requires that the courts pro- tect jurors from being harassed and beset by the de- feated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict.” Moten, 582 F.2d at 664. Accord- ingly, the district court “has the power and the duty to supervise and closely control such inquiries.” United States v. Calbas, 821 F.2d 887, 896 (2d Cir. 1987). For example, the district court may choose to personally conduct the questioning of a juror in order to avoid in- truding on the jury’s deliberations. See, e.g., Calbas, 821 F.2d at 896. At such a hearing, and with limited exceptions, the juror “may not testify about any state- ment made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1). This Court reviews the denial of a Rule 33 motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Archer, 977 F.3d 181, 187 (2d Cir. 2020). A district court only abuses its discretion if its decision “rests on an error of law (such as application of the wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual finding” or “its decision ... cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Id. This Court “has only on rare occasions overturned a verdict or remanded for an evidentiary hearing” based on the failure of a juror to disclose in- formation during jury selection. United States v. Te- man, 465 F. Supp. 3d 277, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). DOJ-OGR-00021718