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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page/7 of 93 64 Juror 50 credibly testified at the hearing that he was able to put aside his experience of sexual abuse and judge the evidence fairly. This is not the sort of “ex- treme situation that call[s] for mandatory removal.” (A.349 (quoting Torres, 128 F.3d at 46)). More generally, it is entirely appropriate for jurors to “rely on their common sense and life experiences to adjudge guilt.” (A.352). These “very human elements ... constitute one of the strengths of our jury system, and we cannot and should not excommunicate them from jury deliberations.” (A.353 (quoting United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 8138, 818 (2d Cir. 1970)). On these facts, “[t]o imply or infer that Juror 50 was biased—simply because he was himself a vic- tim of sexual abuse in a trial related to sexual abuse and sex trafficking, and despite his own credible testi- mony under the penalty of perjury, establishing that he could be an even-handed and impartial juror— would be tantamount to concluding that an individual with a history of sexual abuse can never serve as a fair and impartial juror in such a trial. That is not the law, nor should it be.” (A.346-47). Finally, Maxwell suggests that Judge Nathan abused her discretion by precluding defense counsel from questioning Juror 50, and precluding inquiry into Juror 50’s “statements to journalists.” (Br.70). As to the former, the manner in which the hearing proceeds is committed to a district court’s “sound discretion,” Moten, 582 F.2d at 666, including specifically the “ex- tent to which the parties may participate in question- ing the witnesses,” lannielo, 866 F.2d at 544. Judge Nathan reasonably decided to lead the questioning DOJ-OGR-00021724