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Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page84 of 93 71 alleged in the indictment.” United States v. Banki, 685 F.3d 99, 119 (2d Cir. 2012). Reversal due to a variance is appropriate only when the defendant can establish “that substantial prejudice occurred at trial as a result of the variance,” a showing that cannot be made “where the pleading and the proof substantially corre- spond, where the variance is not of a character that could have misled the defendant at trial, and where the variance is not such as to deprive the accused of his right to be protected against another prosecution for the same offense.” Khalupsky, 5 F.4th at 294. So long as a defendant receives notice of the Govern- ment’s theory, the defendant cannot show prejudice. See, e.g., Banki, 685 F.3d at 119. This Court reviews claims of constructive amend- ment and prejudicial variance de novo. Dove, 884 F.3d at 146, 149. C. Discussion There is no likelihood—much less a substantial likelihood—that the jury convicted Maxwell solely be- cause Jane was transported to New Mexico. At no point during the trial, including its summation, did the Government argue that the jury could convict on a the- ory that Maxwell intended Jane to be abused in New Mexico. Similarly, the District Court’s charge required the jury to decide whether Maxwell intended to violate New York law. The trial contained no instructions de- scribing for the jury any particular criminal statute in New Mexico, or any other basis by which a jury could convict based on conduct in New Mexico. DOJ-OGR-00021731