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Case 22-1426, Document 87, 07/27/2023, 3548202, Page10 of 35 See U.S. v. Stolt-Nielsen, 524 F.Supp.2d 609, 613-14, 620-23, 628 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (dismissing indictment against Stolt-Nielsen’s “directors and/or officers,” as they were “intended third-party beneficiaries of the [Conditional Leniency] Agreement” between the DOJ Antitrust Division and Stolt-Nielsen); U.S. v. Florida West Int’l Airways, Inc., 853 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1228-32 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (dismissing indictment against employee of air cargo provider, as he had “third party beneficiary standing necessary to establish [his] immunity under the Plea Agreement” between the Government and his employer); U.S. v. El-Sadig, 133 F.Supp.2d 600 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (“[E]ven if the non-prosecution agreement was never directly communicated to Defendant El-Sadig, he can enforce the non-prosecution agreement as a third party beneficiary”); U.S. v. CFW Const. Co., Imce., 583 F.Supp. 197 (D.S.C. 1984) (“[A]n intended third party beneficiary of a contract may enforce its provisions....Thus, if the Government, in negotiating the aforementioned plea agreements, ‘promised’ that there would be no prosecution against CFW...the promise must be enforced.”). This rule makes sense. “Plea agreements are interpreted in accordance with contract law principles,” U.S. v. Colon, 220 F.3d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing U.S. v. Altrom 180 F.3d 372, 275 (2d Cir. 1999)), and it is hornbook contract law that an intended third-party beneficiary may enforce a contract. See Subaru Distribs. Corp. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 425 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005); Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 982 (11th Cir. 2005). There is no reason to treat plea or non- DOJ-OGR-00021752