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Case 22-1426, Document 117, 11/01/2024, 3636586, Page17 of 51 appropriate circumstances, be invoked to estop the United States...”); U.S. v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Whenever a United States Attorney negotiates and enters a plea agreement, it is the Government that ‘agrees’ to whatever is agreed to.”); U.S. v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972) (en banc) (vacating conviction where a plea “bargain was allegedly breached in a neighboring district,” adding that “[t]he United States government is the United States government throughout all of the states and districts”); Young v. U.S., 953 F.Supp.2d 1049, 1069 n.4 (D.S.D. 2013) (plea agreement between defendant and “the United States” in West Virginia would bind federal prosecutors in South Dakota); Little v. U.S., Nos. 1:08-cr-59, 1:09-cv-822, 2010 WL 3942749, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 7, 2010) (plea agreement between defendant ‘“‘and the United States of America,” which was “silent as to the effect it may have with respect to other United States Attorneys,” would be interpreted to “bind[] the United States Attorneys in all other districts’’). Annabi is also out of step with the law of this Circuit. It is well-settled that “we determine whether a plea agreement has been breached by looking to the reasonable understanding of the parties and by resolving any ambiguities against the Government.” Jn re Altro, 180 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1999); see also U.S. v. Carmichael, 216 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e ‘construe plea agreements strictly against the Government.’’’) (quoting U.S. v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 559 (2d Cir. 1996)). But Annabi flips this formulation on its head, holding that an ambiguous promise of DOJ-OGR-00021841