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Gasse2271 4226 Doconneen tl 0971 10901722044 3866886 / Faags 2606646 statute as it is written.” If the statute “is ambiguous or contains no express command regarding retroactivity, a reviewing court must determine whether applying the statute to antecedent conduct would create presumptively impermissible retroactive effects.” Here, the inquiry is straightforward. In 2003, Congress amended § 3283 to provide: “No statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years shall preclude such prosecution during the life of the child.”*° The text of § 3283—that no statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution of these offenses will apply—plainly requires that it prevent the application of any statute of limitations that would otherwise apply to past conduct. The statutory text makes clear that Congress intended to extend the time to bring charges of sexual abuse for pre-enactment conduct as the prior statute of limitations was inadequate. This is enough to conclude that the PROTECT Act’s amendment to § 3283 applies to Maxwell’s conduct as charged in the Indictment. 24 In re Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280). 2 Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 55 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 26 PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 202, 117 Stat. 650, 660 (2003). 16 DOJ-OGR-00021863