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Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 21 of 34 supra) defenses, is not legally required and would impose a nearly insurmountable obligation on the Government of marshaling and reviewing information and data in the possession of an entirely separate entity. 1. Applicable Law As described above, Rule 16, Brady, and Giglio apply to materials in the Government’s “possession.” As a general matter, while “[a]n individual prosecutor is presumed . . . to have knowledge of all information gathered in connection with his office’s investigation of the case, .. . knowledge on the part of persons employed by a different office of the government does not in all instances warrant the imputation of knowledge to the prosecutor.” United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). The imposition of such “an unlimited duty on a prosecutor to inquire of other offices not working with the prosecutor’s office on the case in question would inappropriately require us to adopt a monolithic view of government’ that would ‘condemn the prosecution of criminal cases to a state of paralysis.” Jd. (citation & quotation marks omitted); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (Government’s discovery and disclosure obligations extend only to information in the custody of the prosecutor or “others acting on the government’s behalf in the case”). Thus, discovery and disclosure obligations only extend “information known to persons who are a part of the ‘prosecution team’ ... who perform investigative duties or make strategic decisions about the prosecution of the case,” including “police officers and federal agents who submit to the direction of the prosecutor and participate in the investigation.” United States v. Barcelo, 628 F. App’x 36, 38 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Brady is not a basis to compel the Government to gather information in the possession of third parties on behalf of the defense. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 16 DOJ-OGR-00022083