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7 The court of appeals observed that “[t]he only lan- guage in the NPA that speaks to the agreement’s scope is limiting language” referring specifically to the South- ern District of Florida. Pet. App. 10a; see zd. at 9a-10a & n.13 (quoting language in the NPA protecting Epstein from charges “in this District”). The court also found no indication that either the Southern District of New York or the Criminal Division had reviewed and ap- proved the NPA, as DOJ policy would have required if the NPA applied to other districts. See 7d. at 10a. And the court recognized that, from the inception of the of- fice in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92- 93, a U.S. Attorney’s authority had always been “cab- ined to their specific district unless otherwise directed.” Pet. App. 12a; see zd. at 1la-12a & n.18. ARGUMENT Petitioner renews her contention (Pet. 12-18) that Epstein’s nonprosecution agreement with the U.S. At- torney for the Southern District of Florida barred peti- tioner’s prosecution by the U.S. Attorney for the South- ern District of New York. That contention is incorrect, and petitioner does not show that it would succeed in any court of appeals. This case would also be an unsuit- able vehicle for addressing the matters raised in the pe- tition for a writ of certiorari. This Court has previously denied certiorari in a case raising a similar claim. See Prisco v. United States, 562 U.S. 1290 (2011) (No. 10- 7895). It should follow the same course here. 1. The court of appeals correctly held that Epstein’s NPA did not bar petitioner’s prosecution. Pet. App. 8a- 12a. a. Petitioner asserts (Pet. 1) that prosecution for one of her three counts of conviction was barred by a provision of Epstein’s NPA stating, in relevant part, that “the DOJ-OGR-00000230