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Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 122 Filed 01/25/21 Page 4 of 9 Ms. Maxwell, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(ii), requests that the Court dismiss either Count One or Count Three of the Superseding Indictment as multiplicitous because these Counts, as alleged, charge the same offense twice and therefore violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. INTRODUCTION Count One of the Superseding Indictment (“Indictment”) charges Ms. Maxwell with conspiracy to commit a crime against the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Indictment {ff 9-11. Count Three of the Superseding Indictment again charges Ms. Maxwell with the same crime: conspiracy to commit a crime against the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Id. 99 14-17. The only difference between the two counts is the purported crime underlying the § 371 conspiracy charged. In Count One, it is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (enticing minors to travel to engage in illegal sexual activity). Jd. 999-10. In Count Three, it is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (transporting minors with intent to engage in illegal sexual activity). /d. Jj 15-16. This minor variance is insufficient to avoid the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy bar. APPLICABLE LAW “An indictment is multiplicitous when a single offense is alleged in more than one count.” United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For a claim of multiplicity to succeed, the charged offenses must be “the same in fact and in law.” Jd. (quoting United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 2003). “[T]he principle danger created by multiplicity is that a defendant will receive multiple punishments for a single offense.” United States v. Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 910 (4" Cir. 2000). “The second danger [of multiplicity] is the adverse psychological effect on the jury prejudicing DOJ-OGR-00002303