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8 United States also agrees that it will not institute crim- inal char[g]es against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein, including but not limited to” four of Epstein’s assistants. Pet. App. 31a; see Pet. 3-4. But “[n]onprose- cution agreements, like plea bargains, are contractual in nature, and are therefore interpreted in accordance with general principles of contract law.” United States v. Castaneda, 162 F.3d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 1998); ef. San- tobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). And like other contracts, the NPA “must be read as a whole” and in proper context. United States v. Moreno-Membache, 995 F.3d 249, 256 (D.C. Cir. 2021). While “the United States” could conceivably refer to the entire federal government, as petitioner urges, the entirety and context of the NPA here make clear that the term is used—as it often is—as one alternative way to refer to the USAO executing the agreement. See Pet. App. 56a (noting that “the United States” is “common shorthand” for the USAO); United States v. Trevino, 556 F.2d 1265, 1271 (5th Cir. 1977) (interpreting “the United States” in a statute to mean “the prosecutorial division of the government”) (emphasis omitted); cf. United States v. Rourke, 74 F.3d 802, 807 (7th Cir.) (“within the criminal justice system throughout the country, the term ‘the government’ is widely used and understood to refer to the ‘prosecution,’ or ‘the United States Attorney’”), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1215 (1996). Among other things, the NPA invoked “the authority of R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida,” and listed only officials of that USAO in the signature block, Pet. App. 26a; see id. at 33a-34a, 36a-38a—showing that the agreement was with the USAO, not the entire DOJ. DOJ-OGR- 00000231