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10 did not take on some unique broader meaning in the co- conspirators’ clause. Cf. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Gar- ner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 170-173 (2012) (presumption of consistent usage). Moreover, even if the meaning of the coconspirators clause were not clear in context, extrinsic evidence would resolve the ambiguity against petitioner. See United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 551 (3d Cir. 2002). At the time the NPA was negotiated, DOJ policy barred USAOs from entering into NPAs that bound other dis- tricts unless they obtained the approval of those dis- tricts or the Criminal Division. Pet. App. 10a. That pol- icy reflects the longstanding general rule that a U.S. At- torney’s area of responsibility is limited to “his district.” 28 U.S.C. 547; see Pet. App. 1la-12a. While petitioner suggests (Pet. 18) that USAOs are instructed to be ex- plicit on that point, they are also instructed to consult with other DOJ components if they intend to altogether foreclose any prosecution by other USAOs. See Justice Manual § 9-27.630. And there is no indication here that anyone involved in negotiating Epstein’s NPA obtained the necessary approval for binding other USAOs or thought it was necessary. Pet. App. 10a. b. Petitioner’s contrary arguments (Pet. 12-18) lack merit. She invokes general principles that prosecutors should be held to the promises they make, see Pet. 13- 14 (discussing Santobello, supra, and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)), and that “ambiguities in a plea agreement are to be resolved against the govern- ment,” Pet. 16. But those arguments merely beg the questions of what promises the NPA did make and whether the NPA is ambiguous. As explained above, the NPA’s coconspirators clause, read in context, is not DOJ-OGR-00000233