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SHU staff told the OIG that at approximately 8 p.m. on
August 9, all SHU inmates, including Epstein, were
locked in their cells for the evening and we found no
evidence to the contrary. The prison’s recorded video
did not identify any staff or other individuals
approaching Epstein’s SHU tier from the SHU common
area between approximately 10:40 p.m. on August 9
and about 6:30 a.m. on August 10. Additionally, the
OIG did not observe on the recorded video that Noel
and Thomas, who were seated at the desk at the SHU
Officers’ Station immediately outside the area where
Epstein was housed, at any time during the time period
rose from their seats or approached the cell block. We
additionally found that Thomas's and Noel’s reaction on
the morning of August 10 upon finding Epstein hanging
in his cell, as described to us by Thomas, Noel, the
responding Lieutenant, and inmates, was consistent
with their being unaware of any potential harm to
Epstein prior to Thomas entering Epstein’s cell at about
6:30 a.m. on August 10.
None of the MCC New York staff members we
interviewed were aware of any information suggesting
Epstein’s cause of death was something other than
suicide. Additionally, none of the inmates we
interviewed had any credible information suggesting
Epstein’s cause of death was something other than
suicide. Further, the SHU staff and three interviewed
inmates with a direct line of sight to Epstein’s cell door
on the night of his death stated that no one entered or
exited Epstein’s cell after the SHU staff returned Epstein
to his cell on August 9.
As noted, the surveillance camera in the SHU area
where Epstein was housed was live streaming
movement in the hallway outside of Epstein’s cell.
Although the camera was not recording the captured
video, the camera was in plain view of the inmates and
therefore inmates would have been aware that any
hallway movements, including into or out of Epstein’s
cell, could be monitored by BOP staff, even if,
unbeknownst to them, the DVR system was not
recording the live stream at that time. As the OIG has
noted in numerous prior reports, BOP staff and
inmates are aware of where prison cameras are located
and often engage in wrongdoing in locations where
they know cameras are not located.
We noted as well that Epstein had previously been
placed on suicide watch and psychological observation
due to the events of July 23, 2019; that numerous
nooses made from the excess prison sheets were
found in his cell on the morning of August 10; that no
weapons were recovered from his cell after his death;
and that he signed a new Last Will and Testament on
August 8, 2 days before he died. We found that the
staff's failure to assign Epstein a cellmate on August 9;
failure to conduct rounds and counts that evening; and
to allow him to have excess linens in his cell, left
Epstein unmonitored and locked alone in his cell for
hours, which provided him an opportunity to
commit suicide.
Finally, the Medical Examiner who performed the
autopsy detailed for the OIG why Epstein’s injuries were
more consistent with, and indicative of, a suicide by
hanging rather than a homicide by strangulation. The
Medical Examiner also cited the absence of debris
under Epstein’s fingernails, marks on his hands,
contusions to his knuckles, or bruises on his body
evidencing a struggle, which would be expected if
Epstein’s death had been a homicide by strangulation.
Conclusion and Recommendations
This is not the first time the OIG has found significant
job performance and management failures on the part
of BOP personnel and widespread disregard of BOP
policies that are designed to ensure that inmates are
safe, secure, and in good health. The combination of
negligence, misconduct, and outright job performance
failures documented in this report all contributed to an
environment in which arguably one of the BOP’s most
notorious inmates was provided with the opportunity
to take his own life, resulting in significant questions
being asked about the circumstances of his death, how
it could have been allowed to happen, and most
importantly, depriving his numerous victims, many of
whom were underage girls at the time of the alleged
crimes, of their ability to seek justice through the
criminal justice process. The fact that these failures
have been recurring ones at the BOP does not excuse
them and gives additional urgency to the need for DOJ
and BOP leadership to address the chronic staffing,
surveillance, safety and security, and related problems
plaguing the BOP.
The OIG made eight recommendations to the BOP to
address the numerous issues identified during our
investigation and review. Finally, we recommended
that the BOP review the conduct and performance of
the BOP personnel as described in this report and
determine whether discipline or other administrative
action with regard to each of them is appropriate.
DOJ-OGR-00023365
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Document Details
| Filename | DOJ-OGR-00023365.tif |
| File Size | 79.2 KB |
| OCR Confidence | 95.2% |
| Has Readable Text | Yes |
| Text Length | 4,910 characters |
| Indexed | 2026-02-03 20:37:18.971076 |