DOJ-OGR-00000234.tif

11 reasonably susceptible to petitioner’s broad interpreta- tion. Petitioner also invokes (Pet. 16-17) the interpretive principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, in argu- ing that the NPA’s “use of narrowing terms as to Ep- stein’s protections” from prosecution indicates that the eoconspirators clause, which does not contain those terms, was intended to apply to all districts. But the expressio unius canon “grows weaker with each differ- ence in the formulation of the provisions under inspec- tion.” City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 436 (2002); see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002) (“The canon depends on identifying a series of two or more terms or things that should be understood to go hand in hand, which is abridged in cireumstances supporting a sensi- ble inference that the term left out must have been meant to be excluded.”). And the canon therefore does little work in this case. The relevant portions of the NPA do not have any sort of parallelism in their wording or structure that would suggest the necessity for identical terminology on this particular point. Compare, e.g., Pet. App. 26a (“prosecution [of Epstein] in this District for these of- fenses shall be deferred in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida”), with zd. at 3la (“the United States also agrees that it will not institute any criminal char[g]es against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein”). In- deed, as noted above, the phrasing of the coconspirators clause—in which “the United States also agrees” to forgo certain prosecution of coconspirators, 7d. at 3la (emphasis added)—plainly uses “the United States” in reference to the entity otherwise making the agreement DOJ-OGR- 00000234