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Station. Noel said that during her shift on August 10, 2019, no one went to Epstein’s cell and no one other than the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant and CO 3 came into the SHU. Through review and analysis of the SHU video footage, witness statements, and BOP records, the OIG determined that at approximately 10:40 p.m. a CO, believed to be Noel, carried linen or inmate clothing up to the L Tier, which was the last time any CO approached the only entrance to the SHU tier in which Epstein was housed. 2. Lieutenant Rounds BOP policy requires that a Lieutenant visit the SHU during each shift to ensure that all procedures are being followed. BOP training for new Lieutenants instructs that the Operations Lieutenant must visit the SHU at least once per shift and “[t]his visit will be substantially more than just entering the unit, signing the log book, and talking with staff.” Additionally, when the SHU Lieutenant is unavailable, the Operations Lieutenant should make rounds in the SHU on each shift. The training instructs that while in the SHU the Operations Lieutenant must walk each range (tier), inspect logs and records, observe activities, and periodically observe SHU inmate counts. The training further outlines that the SHU Lieutenant is responsible for the direct supervision of the unit, including enforcement of rules, review of paperwork, coordination of activities, movement of inmates, and cell searches. The SHU Lieutenant should make rounds on the ranges (tiers) each day. The statements of multiple witnesses were consistent with BOP training materials. The Northeast Regional Director, the Warden, Associate Warden 1, the Captain, and the Day Watch SHU Officer in Charge all told the OIG that Lieutenants should have walked down all of the SHU tiers when conducting a Lieutenant round in the SHU. Noel said the SHU Lieutenant walked the tiers all the time, however, other Lieutenants did not always walk down the tiers. Multiple witnesses also told the OIG that it was standard practice for the BOP to store the SHU round sheets at the end of each tier in the SHU. This practice was designed to ensure that the assigned COs and Lieutenants walked down each tier when conducting rounds to observe every cell and inmate during the round before initialing the round sheet. On August 9 and 10, 2019, however, the MCC New York SHU round sheets were kept at the SHU Officers’ Station in the common area of the SHU rather than at the end of each tier. None of the Lieutenant rounds conducted on August 9 and 10 alerted the supervisory staff to the fact that Epstein lacked a cellmate. According to MCC New York records, the Day Watch Activities Lieutenant conducted a round in the SHU at 11:27 a.m. on August 9. The Day Watch Activities Lieutenant said he did not specifically recall if he conducted a round in the SHU, but he believed that he did conduct the round. As discussed in greater detail above, the Day Watch Activities Lieutenant told the OIG that he did not know that Epstein’s cellmate had been removed from MCC New York or that Epstein was without a cellmate during his shift on August 9. The Acting Evening Watch Activities Lieutenant told the OIG that she conducted a Lieutenant round in the SHU on August 9 sometime between 5 p.m. and 8 p.m. The Acting Evening Watch Activities Lieutenant told the OIG that she did not know that Epstein’s cellmate had departed from MCC New York or that Epstein required a cellmate because she was only the Acting Activities Lieutenant and had not attended SHU or department head meetings. The Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant reviewed the August 9 round sheets and said that although his signature is on one of the forms as if he conducted a round in the SHU, it was actually the Acting Evening Watch Activities Lieutenant who had conducted the round. The Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant said he did not know why his signature was on the form 69 DOJ-OGR- 00023436