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count. Senior Officer Specialist 6 explained that the action he took was known as “ghost counting,” something he said he would not have done without authorization from the Operations Lieutenant or someone of a higher rank than himself. The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant denied having authorized a “ghost count” and we found no evidence to corroborate Senior Officer Specialist 6’s claim that the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant knew of and approved the false count. The OIG found that Senior Officer Specialist 6 modified the count slips received from the SHU and Receiving and Discharge, failed to request a recount of the SHU inmates, and cleared the 10 p.m. institutional count knowing that it was inaccurate in violation of BOP policy and MCC New York SHU Post Orders. 5. Failure to Adequately Supervise SHU Staff and Conduct Lieutenant Rounds The OIG also found that MCC New York supervisory personnel failed to effectively perform their duties, which contributed to the fact that Epstein was unobserved for many hours before his death. As discussed above, federal regulations require that MCC New York supervisory personnel “put forth honest effort in the performance of their duties,” which includes appropriate supervision of SHU personnel.®' Additionally, BOP policy requires that a Lieutenant visit the SHU during each shift to ensure that all procedures are being followed.® The OIG’s investigation revealed that the Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant and the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant had oversight of the SHU during their respective shifts.°*? The Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that on August 9, 2019, he did not supervise the 4 p.m. count or conduct any rounds in the SHU. He acknowledged that he signed some of the pages of the 4 p.m. count, but he did not sign all of the pages as he should have. Beginning at 10 p.m. on August 9, the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant was the sole supervisor overseeing the SHU. The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that she noticed an error in the 12 a.m. count on August 10, which was due to SHU staff including Inmate 4, who had been internally transferred to Receiving and Discharge, among the inmates in the SHU. According to the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant, the SHU staff should have conducted another count and submitted a new count slip, but she did not know if they actually did so. During her shift, the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant conducted one round in the SHU at approximately 4 a.m. on August 10. The OIG's review of the available SHU security camera video revealed that the Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant was present in the SHU for approximately 7 minutes, during which time she conferred with Noel and Thomas, who were seated at and around the SHU Officers’ Station in the common area of the SHU. The Morning Watch Operations Lieutenant told the OIG that she was not required to visit each tier or go to each individual cell during a lieutenant round, but rather the purpose of the Lieutenant round was for her to speak with the officers on duty. This description of a Lieutenant round 81 5 C.F.R. 8 2635.101(b)(5); see also 5 C.F.R. 8 2635.705(a). 82 BOP Program Statement 5270.11. 83 The Acting Evening Watch Activities Lieutenant also had oversight over the SHU during her overtime shift (4 p.m. to 10 p.m. on August 9, 2019) in an acting capacity. The Evening Watch Operations Lieutenant and the Acting Evening Watch Activities Lieutenant told the OIG that the Acting Evening Watch Activities Lieutenant did not supervise any institutional counts, which was due to the start and end time of her overtime shift. The Acting Evening Watch Activities Lieutenant also told the OIG that she conducted one round in the SHU sometime between 5 p.m. to 8 p.m., during which time she walked down all of the tiers. 106 DOJ-OGR-00023473