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12 (the USAO) and the corresponding geographic limita- tions of that agreement, as reflected in its promises re- garding the prosecution of Epstein himself. Petitioner’s remaining arguments are likewise mis- placed. Her effort (Pet. 15-16) to link the coconspira- tors clause with other NPA provisions addressing potential civil suits under 18 U.S.C. 2255 (2006) is self- defeating, since the latter provisions reinforce the NPA’s limitation to the Southern District of Florida. See Pet. App. 28a (providing that “Epstein will not con- test the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida” in such suits). Sim- ilarly unavailing is petitioner’s emphasis (Pet. 17) on language in one draft of the NPA that would have ex- pressly limited the coconspirators’ protection to the Southern District of Florida. See Pet. App. 117a. There is no indication that anyone involved in drafting the NPA understood the different versions of the cocon- spirators clause to have different geographic scopes. See id. at 122a-123a; see also id. at 125a n.125 (former First Assistant U.S. Attorney telling DOJ investigators that “the NPA was not a ‘global resolution’ and other co-conspirators could have been prosecuted ‘by any other U.S. Attorney’s office in the country’”) (brackets omitted). As the district court explained, an NPA “need not painstakingly spell out ‘the Office of the United States Attorney for Such-and-Such District’ in every in- stance to make clear that it applies only in the district where signed.” Jd. at 56a-57a. At all events, the case-specific interpretation of a particular NPA is not a matter that warrants this Court’s review. See Sup. Ct. R. 10. And that is especially true where “district court and court of appeals are in agreement as to what conclusion the record requires.” DOJ-OGR-00000235