EFTA00615279.pdf

POLIO AFGHANISTAN BACKGROUND BRIEFS FOR BMGF SECURITY AND ACCESS STRATEGY SESSION: AFGHANISTAN 1. Drivers of insecurity and conflict NB: Because of the sensitive nature of the subject matter, information denoted with an asterisk (*) is confidential and can be elaborated upon in oral briefings with IPI. It should be noted at the start that as of now, the polio eradication programme in Afghanistan is achieving far better results than its far larger, more expensive counterpart in Pakistan. Leaving aside the disparity in scale (landmass and population), a major factor responsible for Afghanistan's success is the following: The Afghan Taliban, under the authority of Mullah Omar, have issued explicit approval of and support for the polio eradication programme, with the following conditions: (i) each anti-polio campaign in areas under Taliban control or influence should be coordinated by the Afghan authorities with the "shadow" Taliban authorities in advance; (ii) a "safe passage letter" issued by the Afghan Taliban should be obtained; and (iii) no foreigners should be part of the health team. So far all sides have kept to this bargain. It is equally clear that there is misreporting on anti-polio coverage in Afghanistan, though on a smaller scale than in its neighbor to the south and east, including corruption and poor accounting.* CONFIDENTIAL- DO NOT CIRCULATE !PI INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE HIGHLIGHTS • The explicit Afghan Taliban approval of the polio eradication programme is a major reason for the success of polio eradication in country. • The upcoming elections, changing political alliances and withdrawal of NATO troops, will worsen the situation. • The unpredictability in the intensity, scope and magnitude of expected developments will lead to deterioration in a well-functioning polio eradication programme. • A further challenge will be the military situation, in particular the withdrawal of the NATO/ISAF forces. EFTA00615279 POLIO AFGHANISTAN Trends IPI is of the view that the elections, scheduled to be held in early April, and the outcome (or postponement of the elections) will lead to increasing insecurity and turbulence, already in evidence. Political and health authorities, at the center but especially at the provincial, district and lower levels, will be far too preoccupied with the elections, political alliances of convenience, switching of loyalties, and deals being made and broken all the time, to pay the sustained attention that polio eradication requires.* The Afghan Taliban see their patience paying off. Their spokesperson has declared that anyone who is a candidate, or who votes, will be a target. Impact With unpredictability in the intensity, scope and magnitude of the developments identified above, it is expected that the present, fairly well-functioning polio eradication programme will suffer massively. This negative impact will not only be the result of insecurity and fighting within Afghanistan, but also of an interruption in the regular anti-polio campaigns, as families flee across porous borders. Prospects for 2014 & 2015 Afghan Pashtun families in the southern and eastern Afghan provinces which border on Pakistan, will flee into Pakistan's tribal and adjacent areas, if (as is likely) there are clashes between Afghan security forces and militias and the Afghan Taliban and other militant and jihadi groups, as well as Pakistani militants and jihadis supporting the latter. Since the withdrawal of NATO forces will not take place overnight, it is likely that NATO/ISAF bases and pockets of control will see combat and attacks. The withdrawal date of US troops is still up in the air, with President Karzai refusing to sign a Bilateral Security Agreement with the US unless certain conditions are met (not those reported in the media).* Hence while the US wished to have this signed prior to troop withdrawal, this will probably not happen. The US withdrawal, the largest contingent in Afghanistan, will be staggered over time. It is certain that between io,000 and 30,000 US troops (as trainers, counter- terrorism and counter-insurgency personnel) will stay on beyond the withdrawal, in 6 to 8 US bases. CONFIDENTIAL- DO NOT CIRCULATE Recommendations • BMGF should work closely with its national and international interlocutors to prepare scenarios for continued delivery of anti-polio drops, especially in the areas bordering Pakistan. • BMGF should request the Afghan central authorities to coordinate emergency plans (this will have to be broached very delicately as Kabul's position on everything is that "it's not a problem!"). • BMGF should ask its interlocutors in both Pakistan and Afghanistan to strengthen anti-polio drops delivery at all border crossings (as many people cross both ways via unofficial crossings as via official ones). EFTA00615280