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reference to ‘the government’ [at a plea hearing] clearly
referred to only the United States Attorney for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey”).
3. Indeed, this case would be an unsuitable candi-
date for further review for additional reasons as well.
First, unlike the defendants in the cases cited in the pe-
tition for certiorari, petitioner was not a party to the
relevant agreement; only Epstein and the Florida
USAO were parties to the NPA. Even assuming that a
third party could assert rights under such an agreement
with the government, but see United States v. Lopez,
944 F.2d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting the absence of
“authority to that effect”), petitioner could do so here
only if “the original parties intended the contract to di-
rectly benefit [her] as [a] third partLy],” United States
v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 663 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1014 (2000); see Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa
Clara County, 563 U.S. 110, 117 (2011). But there is no
evidence that the parties to the NPA intended for the
coconspirators clause to benefit petitioner. See p. 4, su-
pra. The government was not even aware of petitioner’s
role in Epstein’s scheme at that time. See Pet. App.
125a-126a.
Second, even if the Florida USAO had purported to
bind all other USAOs in the NPA, it would have lacked
authority to do so. See General Int. Ins. Co. v. Ruggles,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 408, 413 (1827) (“It is a general rule
applicable to agencies of every description, that the
agent cannot bind his principal, except in matters com-
ing within the scope of his authority.”). Under DOJ pol-
icy at the time the Epstein NPA was entered, a USAO
could bind other districts in an NPA only if it obtained
the approval of those districts or the Criminal Division.
Pet. App. 10a. The USAO here did not do so. Jbzd. And
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