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4 what parties mean when they use the term “the United States” without further qualification. II. The Second Circuit’s decision below is wrong and violates the principles set forth in this Court’s prior opinions. In attempting to defend the Second Circuit’s out- come, the government advances a series of contentions about the Epstein NPA’s scope, the U.S. Attorney’s authority, contract law doctrines, and canons of con- struction. Each lacks merit. As the government acknowledges, Opp.8, the start- ing point in any contract is the text. Here, the text could not be more clear. In exchange for Epstein’s guilty plea and other penalties and concessions, “the United States also agrees that it will not institute any criminal charges against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein, including but not limited to [four names].” (emphasis added). This promise is unqualified. It is not geographically limited to the Southern District of Florida, it is not conditioned on the co-conspirators being known by the government at the time, it does not depend on what any particular government attorney may have had in his or her head about who might be a co-conspirator, and it contains no other caveat or exception. This should be the end of the discussion. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”) Ggnored by the government in its opposition). The government seeks to evade this straightforward language by focusing on other clauses in the NPA and on extrinsic context, Opp.8-10, but its efforts only DOJ-OGR- 00000248