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5 underscore that the plain meaning favors Petitioner. First, the government notes (as did the Second Circuit) that the NPA explicitly limited Epstein’s own immunity to the Southern District of Florida, pointing to a clause stating that after Epstein fulfilled the agreement, “no prosecution for the offenses set out on pages 1 and 2 of this Agreement... will be instituted in this District.” (App. 26a). The government then urges the Court to follow it through the looking glass, offering the inexplicable suggestion that the absence of a similar “in this District” qualifier in the co-conspirator clause should be ignored as immaterial. Opp.9. Of course, basic interpretive canons point in exactly the opposite direction. When parties include an express territorial limitation in one clause of a contract and omit it in another, the omission must be presumed intentional. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012). As Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner have explained, “a material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning.” Jd. at 170. Here, the drafters knew how to confine the promise to a single district — they did so for Epstein’s personal non-prosecution assurance. Yet when it came to Epstein’s “potential co-conspirators,” the drafters chose broad, unqualified language. In fact, not only did the parties use an unrestricted jurisdictional clause for the co-conspirators, they amended the document from a previous draft in which the co-conspirator immunity was limited to the Southern District of Florida, changing it to refer more broadly to the “United States.” (Pet. 3; App. 95, 108-126). The government’s interpretation cannot be correct because it would render superfluous the phrase “in this District” in the Epstein clause. If the “United States” means just the Southern District of Florida, DOJ-OGR-00000249