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Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 144 Filed 02/04/21 Page 15 of 25 had expressly prescribed that the 2003 Amendment would not be retroactive; Weingarten considered only whether there was an express prescription that the 2003 Amendment would be retroactive, concluding that the defendant’s counsel could have made “colorable” arguments that there was no such prescription. Jd. at 58.° Congressional intent here could not be clearer. The House bill would have made the 2003 Amendment retroactive, the Senate bill did not, and the conference consciously rejected the retroactivity provision. It is unnecessary to proceed to the second Landgraf step, and Counts One through Four are time-barred. B. Step Two: Application of the 2003 Amendment to Ms. Maxwell’s alleged offenses would have impermissible effects. If the Court were to proceed to the second Landgraf step—whether application of the 2003 Amendment here would have an impermissible retroactive effect—that step also counsels against retroactivity. Any analysis of the retroactivity of a criminal statute of limitations under the second step of Landgraf must be undertaken in conjunction with the principle that unlike civil statutes of limitation, “criminal limitations statutes are ‘to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose.’” Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115 (quoting Scharton, 285 U.S. at 522). As one court recognized in declining to extend a criminal statute of limitations to pre-enactment conduct, if Landgraf and Toussie “are read in conjunction,” courts “must interpret the statute of limitations in a manner favoring repose for Defendant.” United States v. Gentile, 235 F. Supp. 3d 649, 655 (D.N.J. 2017). 3 Nor was this clear evidence of congressional intent raised or considered in United States v. Pierre-Louis, 2018 WL 4043140 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2018), which the government cites in support of its contention that the 2003 Amendment may be applied retroactively. Gov. Mem. at 6. DOJ-OGR-00002663