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Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 144 Filed 02/04/21 Page 23 of 25 Nor does § 3283 apply to extend the statutes of limitations under Counts Three and Four. Those counts arise under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), which prohibits “transporting” minors across state lines “with intent that the [minor] engage in . . . any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense” (emphasis added).’ Neither that offense nor a conspiracy to “transport” a minor with such intent necessarily entails “the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child.” 18 U.S.C. § 3283. Instead, as with § 2422(a), the offense is a “crime of intent and a conviction is entirely sustainable even if no underlying criminal sexual act ever occurs.” United States v. Broxmeyer, 616 F.3d 120, 129 n.8 (2d Cir. 2010). For this reason, Counts Three and Four are not subject to § 3283’s extended statute of limitations. It does not matter that the particular facts alleged in the indictment fall within § 3283. “The embellishment of the indictment does not lengthen the time for prosecution.” Bridges, 346 U.S. at 222. Nor does it matter that sexual abuse of a minor may “often accompan[y]” the offenses charged. See id. “[U]nder the statute[s] creating the offense[s],” physical or sexual abuse of a minor, or kidnapping, is not “an essential ingredient.” Jd. Thus, § 3283’s extension for “offense[s] involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years” does not apply. 18 U.S.C. § 2423 was amended effective September 13, 1994, to add a subsection (b) and make cosmetic adjustments, immaterial here, to what is now subsection (a). Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, PL 103-322, Sept. 13, 1994, Title XVI, § 160001(g), 108 Stat. 1796. 17 DOJ-OGR-00002671