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Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 14 of 16
the alleged conduct at issue here do not apply retroactively to Mr. Epstein’s case (including a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment and a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years). Mr.
Epstein would, moreover, be subject to prosecution if he fled, which he now knows carries a
maximum penalty of up to 10 additional years of imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b)(1)(A)(),
and/or the real risk of an enhanced sentence by the Court in this matter if not acquitted.
It must further be emphasized that the allegations outlined within the indictment are just
that — allegations — and the defendant anticipates substantial factual and legal challenges to the
government case. For one thing, Epstein has potent legal defenses to prosecution under 18
U.S.C. § 1591, the sex trafficking statute driving the pending indictment. We front and briefly
outline one of those defenses for the limited purpose of seeking bail. We will amplify it later,
along with various other arguments, in full-blown dismissal motions.
Section 1591 was passed as part of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000
(“TVPA”), Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (October 28, 2000). In enacting the TVPA,
Congress recognized that human trafficking, particularly of women and children in the sex
industry, “is a modern form of slavery, and it is the largest manifestation of slavery today.” 22
U.S.C. § 7101(b)(1); see also id. at § 7101(b)(2), (4). “The TVPA criminalizes and attempts to
prevent slavery, involuntary servitude, and human trafficking for commercial gain.” United
States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2007). Importantly, “the entire language and
design of the statute as a whole indicates that it is meant to punish those who are the providers or
pimps of children, not the purchasers or the johns.” Fierro v. Taylor, No. 11-CV8573, 2012 WL
13042630, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2012) (quoting United States v. Bonestroo, No. 11-CR-40016,
2012 WL 13704, at *4 (D.S.D. Jan. 4, 2012)) (emphasis added). In Fierro, the district court
found § 1591 inapplicable to consumers or purchasers of sex acts. Here, the principal conduct
underlying the indictment is Mr. Epstein’s payment of money for massages that purportedly
escalated to alleged sex acts. Mr. Epstein’s conduct, however, is akin to consumer or purchaser
behavior and should be outside the ambit of 18 U.S.C. § 1591. See Fierro, 2012 WL 13042630,
at *4 (“[T]he TVPA is inapplicable to individual purchasers of sex from trafficking
victims...”).!°
0 While Fiero represents the law in this district, Mr. Epstein notes that there is a division of
authority on the scope of § 1591. See United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1068 (8th Cir.
2013). The defense respectfully submits that the Fiero court’s approach to this issue is more
persuasive and more consistent with the Congressional purpose to target commercial sex
trafficking.
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Document Details
| Filename | DOJ-OGR-00000287.jpg |
| File Size | 948.9 KB |
| OCR Confidence | 94.0% |
| Has Readable Text | Yes |
| Text Length | 2,963 characters |
| Indexed | 2026-02-03 15:59:44.999917 |