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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 _ Filed 04/16/21 Page 60 of 239 773 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[A]pplying [an] extended limitations period to claims that were unexpired at the time of its enactment does not give rise to an impermissible retroactive effect under Landgraf.”’). The Second Circuit has considered in three cases whether retroactive statutes of limitation are permissible under Landgraf. In Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. School Dist., the Second Circuit held that a new statute shortening the filing period for a civil claim applied retroactively. In reaching that conclusion, the Court noted that “Landgraf and other cases countenance treating statutes of limitations differently from statutory provisions that affect substantive rights,” because statutes of limitations regulate secondary, and not primary conduct. Vernon, 49 F.3d. at 890-91. In In re Enterprise Mortgage Acceptance Co., 391 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit held that applying an extended statute of limitations retroactively created impermissible retroactive effects. Yet in that case, it was critical to the Court’s analysis that—unlike here—the statute revived claims that were previously time-barred. /d. at 410 (“In our view, the resurrection of previously time-barred claims has an impermissible retroactive effect.”’). In Weingarten, the Second Circuit considered, but did not ultimately reach, the issue of whether Section 3283 applies retroactively.'© In discussing the second step of Landgraf, the Court observed: “Courts have routinely recognized a difference between revoking a vested statute of limitations defense and extending a filing period for live claims.” J/d. at 57 (collecting cases). Moreover, in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, the Second Circuit explained why extending an active criminal statute of limitations does not offend any concept of fairness: Certainly it is one thing to revive a prosecution already dead, and another to give it a longer lease of life. The question turns upon how ‘© The First Circuit has similarly considered this issue in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and declined to reach the issue of whether Section 3283 applies retroactively. United States v. Miller, 911 F.3d 638, 644 (1st Cir. 2018). 33 DOJ-OGR- 00002994