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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 _ Filed 04/16/21 Page 85 of 239 particular, this matter appears to be the only remaining active civil case in this District in which claims against Ghislaine Maxwell have been asserted.” (20 Civ. 484 (DCF) (JGK), Dkt. No. 80 at 2). The defendant’s baseless conjecture about the Government’s supposedly nefarious reasons for delaying her prosecution are not sufficient to support a dismissal of the Indictment. The defendant ignores the fact that cases such as this one take time to investigate and indict. The defendant also suggests that the Government engaged in reckless disregard of circumstances that would likely impede her ability to mount an effective defense. (Def. Mot. 7 at 5-6, 15). As an initial matter, this argument falls short of “a standard that requires a showing of intentionality.” United States v. Wey, No. 15 Cr. 611 (AJN), 2017 WL 237651, at *13 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017).24_ While this Court in Wey did not foreclose the possibility of recklessness sufficing under certain circumstances, much as in Wey, “the instant case does not require this Court to pass on the issue,” id., because there is no evidence of recklessness in this case. To the contrary, as detailed above, the Government acted promptly in bringing criminal charges shortly after two key victims whose testimony helped give rise to those charges first agreed to speak with law enforcement. Baseless speculation aside, the defendant offers no argument or evidence as to how or why the Government acted recklessly here. In sum, not only does the defendant fail to demonstrate actual, non-speculative prejudice owing to pre-indictment delay, but she also fails to establish that the Government intentionally 4 This Court has noted “some disagreement among the district courts in this Circuit as to whether reckless—as opposed to intentional—disregard of circumstances . . . may support a due process challenge based on pre-indictment delay,” but concluded that “the pertinent decisions [], on balance, more plainly comport with a standard that requires a showing of intentionality.” Wey, 2017 WL 237651, at *13 n.8 (citing Cornielle, 171 F.3d at 752 (defendant bears burden of showing that “delay was a course intentionally pursued by the government for an improper purpose”) (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Gonzalez, No. 00 Cr. 447, 2000 WL 1721171, at *1 & n.l (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2000) (“Neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit . . . has adopted this alternative [recklessness] standard.’’). 58 DOJ-OGR-00003019