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Case 9:08-CAS® 22 KAIMO49cRMEnt 2deczmMeniched orFtesS DoEe o7RAGedi ef Page 5 of 20
obligations undertaken therein to be set aside.’ See, e. g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
262 (1971) (“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise
must be fulfilled.”); United States v. Harvey, 869 F.2d 1439, 1443 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Due
process requires the government to adhere to the terms of any plea bargain or immunity
agreement it makes.”). Indeed, even if this Court were somehow to set aside the Non-
Prosecution Agreement on the authority of the CVRA, and even if after consultation with
Petitioners the United States determined that it would be proper and desirable to institute a
criminal prosecution in the Southern District of Florida against Epstein on the criminal charges
contemplated in the Non-Prosecution Agreement, the United States would still be
constitutionally required to adhere to the negotiated terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreement.
See, e.g., Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262; Harvey, 869 F.2d at 1443.
Due process considerations further bar this Court from setting aside a non-prosecution
agreement that grants contractual rights to a contracting party (Epstein) who has not been made a
party to the proceedings before the Court. See, e.g., School Dist. of City of Pontiac v. Secretary
of U.S. Dept. of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 303 (6th Cir. 2009) (“It is hornbook law that all parties to a
contract are necessary in an action challenging its validity ....”); Dawavendewa v. Salt River
Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] party to a contract is
necessary, and if not susceptible to joinder, indispensable to litigation seeking to decimate that
subsequent 18-month state incarceration).
* To the extent that the Petitioners’ requested invalidation of the Non-Prosecution
Agreement would implicitly reject and nullify the correctness of both the state court’s acceptance
of Epstein’s guilty plea and the resulting judgment of conviction —which were induced in part by
the Non-Prosecution Agreement — such judicial action might raise additional questions about this
Court’s jurisdiction under the Rooker/Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d
1258, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2009); Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 466-68 (11th Cir. 1996).
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