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Case 9:08 a6 b 236K ANH IB ceiRentBegumephfered criled SH DdéRet d7aas/aGief Ibage 13 of 20 been curtailed by the Non-Prosecution Agreement — to discuss the possibility of pursuing federal criminal charges against Epstein.'* Nothing precludes Petitioners from doing so, and there is nothing to indicate that Petitioners’ wishes to confer with government attorneys in those districts would be rebuffed in any way. Indeed, it would be rank speculation by Petitioners to contend otherwise. Here, Petitioners have acknowledged that the best relief they can hope to obtain through these proceedings is the ability to confer with the attorneys for the government. See, e.g., July 11, 2008 Hr’g Tr. at 7 (agreeing that “the best [Petitioners] can get” is the “right to confer’’). Yet, under the circumstances, a claim that Petitioners have been denied the opportunity to confer with the attorney for the government about the filing and disposition of criminal charges against Epstein is premature and constitutionally unripe. “This is plainly the type of hypothetical case that [a court] should avoid deciding.” Association for Children for Enforcement of Support, Inc. v. Conger, 899 F.2d 1164, 1166 (11th Cir. 1990). Any speculation by Petitioners that they might prospectively be denied the opportunity to confer with the government about still-legally-viable federal charges against Epstein simply cannot ripen Petitioners’ claims. See id. (recognizing that courts “do not generally decide cases based on a party’s predicted conduct’). For these reasons, Petitioners’ claims in these proceedings should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Jacks, 642 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that claims that are “based on events that may take place in the future” are to be “dismissed for lack of jurisdiction”) (citing Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1574 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[R]ipeness goes to whether the district court had subject matter 'S Petitioners could also approach the United States Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida, but, due to that office’s recusal-based derivative prosecutorial responsibilities in the Southern District of Florida, see supra note 8, the Non-Prosecution Agreement would constrain the possible filing of federal charges by that office in the Southern District of Florida. 12 DOJ-OGR-00000317