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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204-3 Filed 04/16/21 Page 53 of 348 recalled generally having conversations with Sloman and Menchel about the Epstein case, but he could not recall with specificity when those conversations took place or the details of the discussions. Sloman told OPR that because of his broad responsibilities as FAUSA, he left it to Menchel, as a highly experienced trial attorney and the Criminal Division Chief, to work directly with Acosta, and Sloman recalled that it was Menchel and Lourie who conducted a “granular review” of the charging package. Acosta confirmed to OPR that Sloman and Menchel “were a team” who became involved in issues as needed, and if Sloman perceived that Menchel was taking the lead on the Epstein matter, Sloman may have deferred to Menchel. G. May — June 2007: Miami Managers Consider the Prosecution Memorandum and Proposed Charges When she submitted the prosecution memorandum, Villafafia intended to file charges by May 15, 2007, and the FBI planned to arrest Epstein immediately thereafter. Villafafia, however, had not obtained authorization to indict on that schedule. The managers in Miami wanted time to analyze the lengthy prosecution memorandum and consider the potential charges and charging strategy. Just a few days after he received the prosecution memorandum, and after learning that the FBI was planning a press conference for May 15, Sloman advised Villafafia that “[t]his Office has not approved the indictment. Therefore, please do not commit us to anything at this time.”°° On May 10, 2007, with Menchel’s concurrence, Lourie sent a copy of Villafafia’s prosecution memorandum to CEOS Chief Andrew Oosterbaan, who in turn sent it to his deputy and another CEOS attorney, asking them to assess the legal issues involved in the case and describing it as a “highly sensitive” case involving “a high profile, very rich defendant.”*’ After CEOS reviewed the materials, Oosterbaan responded to Lourie with an email stating that the memorandum was “exhaustive” and “well done” and noting that Villafafia “has correctly focused on the issues as we see them.” He summarized CEOS’s analysis of the application of key facts to the statutes she proposed charging, concurring in Villafafia’s assessments but noting that further research was needed to determine whether certain statutes required proof of a defendant’s knowledge of victims’ ages. Oosterbaan offered to assign a CEOS attorney to work with Villafafia on the case. Lourie forwarded Oosterbaan’s email to Menchel and Villafafia. Meanwhile, contemporaneous emails show that Lourie, at least, was already considering an early resolution of the case through a pre-indictment plea agreement.*” After Lourie spoke with 38 Lourie later reported to Menchel that the FBI had “wanted to arrest [Epstein] in [the] Virgin Islands during a beauty pageant . . . where he is a judge.” The case agent recalled that she and her co-case agent were disappointed with the decision, and that the Supervisory Special Agent was “extremely upset” about it. After the federal investigation began, and except for his self-surrender to face the state indictment in July 2006, Epstein largely stayed away from West Palm Beach, only returning occasionally. a Before becoming Chief of CEOS, Oosterbaan was an AUSA at the USAO for about ten years and was good friends with Lourie. 40 In her prosecution memorandum, Villafafia argued against pre-charge plea negotiations, arguing that it “may undermine our arguments for pretrial detention.” Menchel, however, told OPR that he did not consider strengthening a bail argument to be a valid ground to decline to meet with defense counsel about a case. 27 DOJ-OGR-00003229