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Case 18-2868, Document 273-2, 08/09/2019, 2628218, Page12 of 25 In this case, the District Court erred in several respects.'4 First, it failed to give proper weight to the presumption of access that attaches to documents filed in connection with summary judgment motions. The District Court reasoned that the summary judgment materials were “entitled to a lesser presumption of access” because “summary judgment was denied by the Court.” In assigning a “lesser presumption” to such materials, the District Court relied on a single sentence of dicta from our decision in United States v. Amodeo.!6 We have since clarified, however, that this sentence was based on a “quotation from a partial concurrence and partial dissent in the D.C. Circuit . . . [and] is thus not the considered decision of either this court or the D.C. Circuit.”"7 In fact, we have expressly rejected the proposition that “different types of documents might receive different of California, Riverside Cty., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984); the protection of attorney-client privilege, Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 125; “the danger of impairing law enforcement or judicial efficiency,” SEC. v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 232 (2d Cir. 2001); and “the privacy interest of those who resist disclosure,” id. 14 Our discussion here focuses specifically on the District Court’s denial of the Herald’s motion to unseal the entire record. Because this decision grants relief to all Appellants, we need not discuss any separate, additional error in the District Court’s denial of the earlier motions to unseal. 15 Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 444. 16 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Amodeo II’) (“One judge [in the District of Columbia Circuit] has pointed out, for example, that where a district court denied the summary judgment motion, essentially postponing a final determination of substantive legal rights, the public interest in access is not as pressing.” (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original)). ” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121. 12