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Case 18-2868, Document 273-2, 08/09/2019, 2628218, Page23 of 25 We have long noted that the press plays a vital role in ensuring the public right of access and in enhancing “the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process.”** When faithfully observing its best traditions, the print and electronic media “contributes to public understanding of the rule of law” and “validates [its] claim of functioning as surrogates for the public.” At the same time, the media does the public a profound disservice when it reports on parties’ allegations uncritically. We have previously observed that courts cannot possibly “discredit every statement or document turned up in the course of litigation,” and we have criticized “the use by the media of the somewhat misleading term 5K ‘court records’ in referring to such items.”©° Even ordinarily critical v. Smith, 153 N.Y. 214, 219-20 (1897)). It follows, then, that immaterial and impertinent statements are (at least nominally) actionable, particularly when they are “so needlessly defamatory as to warrant the inference of express malice.” Id. (same). It seems to us that when a district court strikes statements from the record pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) on the ground that the matter is “impertinent” and “immaterial,” it makes the very same determination that permits a defamation action under the common law. We think the judicial system would be well served were our common law courts to revitalize this crucial qualification to the litigation privilege. 48 Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982)). 49 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1980) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 50 Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049. 23