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Case 18-2868, Document 276, 08/09/2019, 2628224, Page38 of 77 forceful argument that plaintiff's shifting and inconsistent stories about what allegedly happened rendered her inherently unbelievable and proved her increasingly provocative and lurid allegations were “obvious lies.” These are precisely the messages Mr. Barden sent to them. 99 66 The general nature of Mr. Barden’s assertions (“allegations,” “original allegations,” “claims”), the distinction between plaintiff's “original” and “new” allegations, and the inferences he drew from comparing the “original” and “new” allegations—together—powerfully demonstrate that the January 2015 statement was nothing more than opinion. B. In this Rule 56 proceeding, this Court’s Rule 12(b)(6) opinion does not control the question of law whether the January 2015 statement constitutes nonactionable opinion. In its Rule 12(b)(6) opinion the Court, relying on Davis v. Boeheim, 22 N.E.3d 999 (2014), ruled that the three allegedly defamatory statements in the January 2015 statement (see Doc.1 § 30(a)-(c)) have a specific and readily understood factual meaning, are capable of being proven true or false, and “clearly constitute fact to the reader.” Doc.37 at 9. We respectfully suggest the Court’s Rule 12(b)(6) decision does not control in this Rule 56 proceeding. To begin with, the standards for deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion are substantially different from the standards for deciding a Rule 56 motion. As the Court noted, in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion the court must accept as true the factual allegations and draw all inferences in the plaintiffs favor; a plaintiff need only state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Jd. at 3 (internal quotations omitted). In contrast, in deciding a Rule 56 motion the plaintiff defending the motion may not “rest on [the] allegations” in her complaint. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The difference in the standards is crucial here. 399 As this Court recognized, ““[t]he dispositive inquiry’” for purposes of deciding whether an allegedly defamatory statement is fact or nonactionable opinion is whether ““‘a reasonable 20 reader could have concluded that the statements were conveying facts about the plaintiff. 31