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Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document11i_ Filed 07/12/19 Page 8of 14 Honorable Richard M. Berman United States District Judge July 12, 2019 Page 8 4. Home Confinement and Electronic Monitoring Provide No Assurance The defendant’s proposal of ankle-bracelet monitoring should be of no comfort to the Court. In particular, the defendant’s endorsement of a GPS monitoring bracelet rather than a radio frequency bracelet is farcical because neither one is useful or effective after it has been removed. At best, home confinement and electronic monitoring would reduce his head start should he decide to cut the bracelet and flee. See United States v. Zarger, No. 00 Cr. 773, 2000 WL 1134364, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2000) (rejecting defendant’s application for bail in part because home detention with electronic monitoring “at best . . . limits a fleeing defendant’s head start’); see also United States v. Casteneda, No. 18 Cr. 047, 2018 WL 888744, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2018) (same); United States v. Anderson, 384 F. Supp.2d 32, 41 (D.D.C. 2005) (same); United States v. Benatar, No. 02 Cr. 099, 2002 WL 31410262, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002) (same). 5. Private Security is Inadequate, Unfair, and Impractical Here The defendant also proposes the use of a private security force to march him to and from court under the threat of deadly force. This proposal should be rejected. At the outset, it is far from clear that private jail, which seeks to replicate the conditions of a government-run detention facility in the defendant’s home, is a condition of “release” that implicates the Bail Reform Act. “[T]here is a debate within the judiciary over whether a defendant, if she is able to perfectly replicate a private jail in her own home at her own cost, has a right to do so under the Bail Reform Act and the United States Constitution.” United States v. Valerio, 9 F. Supp. 3d 283, 292 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (Bianco, J.) (collecting cases). The Second Circuit has never directly addressed this issue. See United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 78 n.18 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The government has not argued and, therefore, we have no occasion to consider whether it would be ‘contrary to the principles of detention and release on bail’ to allow wealthy defendants ‘to buy their way out by constructing a private jail.” (citations omitted)). Indeed, a decision by this Court reasoned that “the very severe restrictions” in the private jail proposal presented to him did “not appear to contemplate ‘release’ so much as it describes a very expensive form of private jail or detention.” United States v. Zarrab, 2016 WL 3681423, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2016). Courts have long been troubled by private jail proposals like the defendant’s which, “at best ‘elaborately replicate a detention facility without the confidence of security such a facility instills.’” United States v. Orena, 986 F.2d 628, 632 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Gotti, 776 F. Supp. 666, 672 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting private jail proposal)); see also Valerio, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 295 (“The questions about the legal authorization for the private security firm to use force against defendant should he violate the terms of his release, and the questions over whether the guards can or should be armed, underscore the legal and practical uncertainties—indeed, the imperfections—of the private jail-like concept envisioned by defendant, as compared to the more secure option of an actual jail.”). A private security firm simply cannot replicate the controlled environment of a federal correctional facility, in which, typically, all of the needs to the prisoner can be attended to without placing the prisoner in the community at large; the defendant’s proposed private jail arrangement would have the effect of permanently placing him in just such a high- flight-risk circumstance. The risk of a public escape attempt while in the community and involving DOJ-OGR- 00000336