DocumentCloud_Epstein_Docs_p00811.png

Case 18-2868, Document 279, 08/09/2019, 2628231, Page29 of 37 Gow, to issue the statement,'? and he believed he had an affirmative duty in representing Ms. Maxwell to prepare the statement and cause it to be delivered to the journalists.” Plaintiff argues that when Mr. Barden issued the January 2015 statement on Ms. Maxwell’s behalf, he had only “‘wholly unmeritorious claims, unsupported in law and fact, in violation of counsel’s ethical obligations’” and did not have “‘good faith anticipated litigation.’” Resp. 46 (quoting Khalil, 28 N.E.3d at 19; italics omitted). Plaintiff's rationale? Because she was telling the truth and so the media would only be reporting the truth. /d. That is a nonsensical, frivolous argument. Whether Mr. Barden, who represents Ms. Maxwell, had a meritorious or good faith basis for anticipating defamation litigation has nothing to do with whether the media believed plaintiff was telling the truth, and surely not whether the plaintiff believed or said she was telling the truth. Based on his knowledge of plaintiff's history, Mr. Barden in good faith believed that plaintiff had been making false allegations for years and that the falsity of the allegations “should have been obvious to the media.” Doc.542-7, Ex.K { 13; see id. J§[ 14, 16-17, 20-23, 26-28, 30. Accordingly, at the time he caused the statement to issue, Mr. Barden had a good-faith basis to anticipate litigation against any of the media that republished plaintiff's false allegations. It hardly matters for purposes of the pre-litigation privilege whether the media republished or did not republish plaintiff's allegations or whether Mr. Barden ultimately did or did not sue any of the media for any republication. As the Khalil court recognized, “[a]ttorneys often send cease and desist letters to avoid litigation,” 28 N.E.3d at 19, and such letters have a The Khalil court admonished attorneys to “exercise caution when corresponding with unrepresented potential parties who may be particularly susceptible to harassment and unequipped to respond properly even to appropriate communications from an attorney.” Khalil, 28 N.E.3d at 19 n.2. See Doc.542-7, Ex.K { 26. 24