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Case 18-2868, Document 279, 08/09/2019, 2628231, Page34 of 37 435:7-455:6 & Depo. Ex.7. These include her claims that: (1) she was 17 when she flew to the Caribbean with Mr. Epstein and Ms. Maxwell “went to pick up Bill in a huge black helicopter,” referring to former President Bill Clinton; (2) her conversation with Mr. Clinton about Ms. Maxwell’s pilot skills; and (3) Donald Trump was a “good friend” of Mr. Epstein’s and “flirted with me”. Plaintiff's admissions on the falsity of her original allegations are fatal to her defamation claim as to the second sentence. The eleven admittedly false “original allegations” axiomatically would warrant the second sentence. Plaintiff has no possible way to prove the second sentence is false. Indeed, like Ms. Maxwell’s first sentence, the second sentence literally is true: more than one of plaintiffs original allegations are untrue. A statement that literally is true cannot be defamatory as a matter of law. See Law Firm of Daniel P. Foster, 844 F.2d at 959. Sentence No. 3. Defamation as to the third sentence is foreclosed. To begin with, as discussed above, whether plaintiff has uttered “obvious lies” is a matter of opinion: in the face of plaintiff's gratuitous and lurid allegations of Ms. Maxwell’s years-long participation at the center of a child sex-trafficking ring, for the journalists-recipients of the July 2015 statement the phrase was an anticipated “epithet[], fiery rhetoric or hyperbole,” Steinhilber, 501 N.E.2d at 556 (internal quotations omitted); see Tel. Sys. Int’l, 2003 WL 22232908, at *2 (observing Court’s previous holding in Rizzuto that defendants’ use of phrases “conned,” “rip off’ and “lying” in advertisements were not actionable as libel and were “rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered themselves unfairly treated and sought to bring what they alleged were the true facts to the readers”) (internal quotations omitted). Even if arguendo the third sentence—plaintiff’s “claims are obvious lies”—cannot be considered opinion, the Rule 56 record forecloses a defamation claim. The sentence does not specify which of plaintiff’s “claims,” i.e., allegations, are obvious lies. It could refer to the 29