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Case 18-2868, Document 280, 08/09/2019, 2628232, Page51 of 74 Similarly, in Black v. Green Harbour Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc., 19 A.D.3d 962, 963, 798 N.Y.S.2d 753, 754 (2005), cited by Defendant, the Court held a privilege applied to a letter sent by a home owner’s association board of directors to the association’s members informing them of the status of litigation to which the association was a party, and to the association’s letter to the state attorney general sent to discharge it’s duties to the association. In this case, litigation was actually pending, the communication was sent by a party to that litigation as part of its duties, and the communication itself concerned the litigation. Defendant’s press release fits none of those descriptions. Unsurprisingly, Defendant cites to no case in which a Court has held that this or any qualified privilege extends to internationally disseminated press releases defaming a non-party to the purported “anticipated” litigation. Regardless of whether or not Barden had a hand in drafting the statement (another disputed issue of fact for the jury), Defendant issued the statement, instructed that it be published, and the statement she issued was attributed to her, and not to her attorney (or his agents). Accordingly, all the case law Defendant cites about an attorney making a statement (or a client making a statement to their attorney or malpractice carrier) is inapposite. 2. Defendant is foreclosed from using the pre-litigation privilege because she acted with malice. In any event, because Defendant acted with malice, she cannot avail herself of the pre- litigation privilege. As this Court has explained denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ““There is no qualified privilege under New York law when such statements are spoken with malice, knowledge of their falsity, or reckless disregard for their truth.’” Giuffre v. Maxwell, 165 F. Supp. 3d at 155 (citing Block, 691 F. Supp. at 699 (Sweet, J.) (S.D.N.Y. 1988). There is ample record evidence that Defendant acted with malice in issuing the press release, thereby making the litigation privilege inapplicable. See Block, 691 F. Supp. at 700 (Sweet, J.) (“Here, sufficient 43