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Case 18-2868, Document 280, 08/09/2019, 2628232, Page57 of 74 unclear. The fact that Ms. Giuffre worked at Taco Bell for a few days hardly establishes she was not abused by Defendant and Epstein. Indeed, if anything its shows the vulnerability of Ms. Giuffre to enticements that a billionaire and his wealthy and powerful girlfriend could offer. In any event, what to make of such fact is something for the jury to consider. They are irrelevant for the same reason as above: Ms. Giuffre never made any claims about her studies or her prior employment. Indeed, neither Ms. Giuffre’s statement about being recruited by Defendant as a child, nor Defendant’s refutation even mentions Ms. Giuffre’s lack of schooling or lack of a stable home as a child. Purported facts that have nothing to do with Ms. Giuffre’s claims of sexual abuse against Defendant, and nothing to do with Defendant calling Ms. Giuffre a liar for such claims, do not establish the “substantial truth” of Defendant’s statement. Tellingly, Defendant cites to no analogous case in any jurisdiction that even suggests otherwise. VI. PLAINTIFF DOES NOT NEED TO ESTABLISH MALICE FOR HER DEFAMATION CLAIM, BUT IN THE EVENT THE COURT RULES OTHERWISE, THERE IS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT RECORD EVIDENCE FOR A REASONABLE JURY TO DETERMINE DEFENDANT ACTED WITH ACTUAL MALICE Defendant’s next (and, again, quite remarkable) argument is that Ms. Giuffre somehow will be unable to establish actual malice in this case. One would think that a sex trafficker calling one of her victims a liar would be a quintessential example of actual malice. Defendant’s spurious case citations and misplaced argument do not detract from this core fact. Though Defendant does not mention the legal standard for actual malice until she is 48 pages into her 68-page brief,* the legal definition of actual malice, as defined by the United “© Though perhaps a scrivener’s error, Defendant errantly cites to two Supreme Court cases — Gerts v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) and Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) — that arose out of the laws of Illinois and Pennsylvania, respectively, to support a proposition concerning New York law. Defendant also cites to Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 105 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1989), wherein the ruling was not at summary judgment, and the plaintiff in the defamation case was a judicial candidate in a public election. 49