DocumentCloud_Epstein_Docs_p02011.png

Case 18-2868, Document 287, 08/09/2019, 2628251, Page63 of 76 same ‘gist’ or ‘sting’ as the original libel, that is, the same effect on the mind of the reader.”). The Honorable Loretta A. Preska has noted that cases addressing whether a statement is substantially true “fall along a broad spectrum.” Jewell, 23 F. Supp. at 367. There are cases in which a statement is non-actionable because it is completely true. See, e.g., Carter, 233 A.D.2d 473, 474 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1996) (claim that defendant committed libel by informing the authorities that plaintiff was endorsing checks made payable to the defendant and depositing them in plaintiff’s account held non-actionable where plaintiff had in fact endorsed checks made payable to the defendant). There are cases where “one struggles to identify any area of ambiguity as to truth.” Jewell, 23 F. Supp. at 368; see, e.g., Miller v. Journal-News, 211 A.D.2d 626, 627 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1995) (statement that plaintiff was “suspended” substantially true where plaintiff was placed on “administrative leave”). There are cases where the line between the statement and the admitted truth is more tenuous, but the overall “gist” cannot be said to be substantially different. See, e.g., Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that statement which implied that plaintiff was then currently an adulterer was substantially true 63