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Case 18-2868, Document 287, 08/09/2019, 2628251, Page66 of 76 First, statements that Giuffre’s claims ‘against [Maxwell] are untrue,’ have been ‘shown to be untrue,’ and are ‘obvious lies’ have a specific and readily understood factual meaning: that Giuffre is not telling the truth about her history of sexual abuse and [Maxwell]’s role, and that some verifiable investigation has occurred and come to a definitive conclusion proving that fact. Second, these statements (as they themselves allege), are capable of being proven true or false, and therefore constitute actionable fact and not opinion. Third, in their full context, while [Maxwell]’s statements have the effect of generally denying Giuffre’s story, they also clearly constitute fact to the reader. Giuffre v. Maxwell, 165 F. Supp. 3d 147, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). This Court further concluded that [Giuffre] cannot be making claims shown to be untrue that are obvious lies without being a liar. Furthermore, to suggest an individual is not telling the truth about her history of having been sexually assaulted as a minor constitutes more than a general denial, it alleges something deeply disturbing about the character of an individual willing to be publicly dishonest about such a reprehensible crime. [Maxwell]’s statements clearly imply that the denials are based on facts separate and contradictory to those that [Giuffre] has alleged. Id. Maxwell argues that the “context” of the entire statement “tested against the understanding of the average reader” should be that of a press release as a whole being read only by journalists. Def.’s Br. at 22 (quoting Aronson v. Wiersma, 483 N.E.2d 1138, 1139 (1985)). However, the ultimate 66