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Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 1320-18 Filed 01/03/24 Page 24 of 40 and fair opportunity to litigate the decision that now controls and the issue in the prior action must be identical to and decisive of the issue in the instant action. Zois v. Cooper, 268 B.R. 890, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd sub nom. In re Zois, 73 F. App’x 509 (2d Cir. 2003). A non-party can be bound by a decision, so long as her interests were “effectively represented.” Zois, 268 B.R. at 893.'? As this Court can readily determine from reviewing the pleadings Dershowitz filed in the Florida case, see McCawley Decl. at Ex. 6 & 8, Dershowitz fully briefed identical issues to those presented here. And he was effectively representing Maxwell at the time. The elements of collateral estoppel apply. Moreover, entirely apart from collateral estoppel doctrine, Judge Lynch’s decision is highly persuasive. Judge Lynch was the presiding judge over the Dershowitz matter, so he was intimately familiar with (for example) what matters were “at issue” in that particular case. Moreover, Judge Lynch is, of course, a Florida judge skilled in applying Florida legal principles. His ruling on whether a waiver of attorney client privilege existed under Florida law should be given heavy weight here. See Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 370 (2d Cir. 1999). Finally, Defendant’s briefing entirely ignores even the existence of Judge Lynch’s ruling. In such circumstances where the Defendant has failed to offer any reason for questioning Judge Lynch’s holding, this Court should follow Judge Lynch’s lead and hold that no waiver of the attorney-client privilege exists under Florida law. And, because Florida law controlled when the disclosures took place, under Fed. R. Evid. 502(c), no waiver exists in this proceeding. '3 Zois relied on New York law. Florida law is to the same effect, as is federal doctrine. See O'Brien v. Fed. Trust Bank, F.S.B., 727 So. 2d 296, 298 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (“Collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of issues where the identical issues previously have been litigated between the parties or their privies.”); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979). 17